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Abstract
Matrix factorization is a popular method to build a recommender system. In such
a system, existing users and items are associated to a low-dimension vector called
a profile. The profiles of a user and of an item can be combined (via inner product)
to predict the rating that the user would get on the item. One important issue of
such a system is the so-called cold-start problem: how to allow a user to learn her
profile, so that she can then get accurate recommendations?
While a profile can be computed if the user is willing to rate well-chosen items
and/or provide supplemental attributes or demographics (such as gender), reveal-
ing this additional information is known to allow the analyst of the recommender
system to infer many more personal sensitive information. We design a protocol
to allow privacy-conscious users to benefit from matrix-factorization-based rec-
ommender systems while preserving their privacy. More precisely, our protocol
enables a user to learn her profile, and from that to predict ratings without the user
revealing any personal information. The protocol is secure in the standard model
against semi-honest adversaries.
1 Introduction
Matrix factorization [4, 8] is a popular method to build a recommender system. As exemplified
by the Netflix Prize competition [14], it has become a dominant technology within collaborative-
filtering recommenders. Matrix factorization provides a better predictive accuracy compared to
classical neighborhood methods while at the same time is scalable and offers much flexibility for
modeling a variety of real-life situations [10].
The cold-start problem. A major problem facing collaborative-filtering recommender systems is
how to provide recommendations when rating data is too sparse for a subset of users or items. As
a special case, the so-called cold-start problem [20] is how to make recommendations to new users
who have not yet rated any item or to deal with new items that have not yet been rated by users.
The cold-start problem is usually addressed by incorporating additional input sources to compensate
for the lack of rating data. In addition to ratings, the analyst may for example collect certain user
attributes, such as gender, age, or other demographic information [1, 9].
Another approach for dealing with the cold-start problem is to ask users to rate a minimum number
of (well chosen) items [18].
Inference attacks. Relying on additional input sources to address the cold-start problem may be
difficult to deploy in practice as privacy-conscious users may be reluctant to supply some of their
attributes. The second approach does not require to collect extra information beyond the ratings and
is very efficient. Unfortunately, the additional received ratings may reveal a lot of information about
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a user to the analyst. Recent research has indeed demonstrated that this can be used by the analyst
to infer private user attributes such as political affiliation [11, 19], sexual orientation [11], age [22],
gender [19, 22], and even drug use [11]. Further privacy threats are reported in [2, 3, 13].
A natural question therefore raised in [7] is how a privacy-conscious user can benefit from recom-
mender systems while preventing the inference of her private information.
Contributions. In this paper, we show how a privacy-conscious user can learn her profile without
revealing any information to the analyst. The protocol is practical and proven secure against semi-
honest adversaries. The communication complexity of the protocol only grows with the square-root
of the number of items.
Once the privacy-conscious user learns her profile u, she can run a straightforward protocol to
learn the predicted rating of any item j in the database. This indeed only requires to compute the
inner product between the user profile u (known to the user) and the item profile vj (known to the
analyst) [15, Sect. 4.1].
Related work. In [7], Ioannidis et al. propose a learning protocol which enables the user to prevent
the analyst from learning some (previously defined) private user attributes. This protocol perfectly
hides these chosen attributes to the analyst, in an information-theoretic way. The authors also prove
that no such protocol can be more accurate, when the analyst ends up knowing the resulting profile,
nor can disclose less information for the same accuracy.
Unfortunately, this protocol has also several drawbacks, most of them inherent to the fact it is
information-theoretically secure and does not rely on computational assumptions. First, this pro-
tocol still needs to disclose some information about the analyst database to everybody. Second, this
protocol is not as accurate as a non-privacy-preserving protocol would be. This is inherent to the
fact that Ioannidis et al. restricted themselves to protocols where the analyst learns an approximate
profile of the user at the end, so that the resulting user profile shall not contain any information about
the private attribute. Third, it can only hide a small fixed set of attributes: all attributes which are not
explicitly hidden may be recovered by the analyst. And it may be hard for a user to decide which
attributes are really important to her, due to the wide range of possible attributes. Finally, the analyst
needs to ask users1 to reveal which attributes they deem private. This may not only bother a lot these
users, but also brings up the question of the reliability of these data. No user will be likely admitting
she is a drug addict, for example, even if she is ensured that this data will not be disclosed.2
2 Preliminaries
R is the field of real numbers. For any integer n, Zn is the ring of integers modulo n, while Z
∗
n is its
multiplicative group. Vectors are always column vectors and are denoted as u or vj . Matrices are
denoted with capital letters.
2.1 Cryptographic tools
Public-key encryption. A public-key encryption scheme is defined by three algorithms: KeyGen,
Enc, and Dec. (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1κ) generates a matching pair of public key pk and secret key
sk, given a security parameter 1κ (unary notation). The public key pk is used to encrypt a message
x ∈ M into a ciphertext c: c ← Enc(pk, x). The secret key sk is used to decrypt a ciphertext c:
x← Dec(sk, c). We assume that the encryption scheme is perfectly correct and semantically secure
(i.e., IND-CPA) [6].
Homomorphic encryption. An additively homomorphic encryption scheme is such that the mes-
sage set M is an additive group, and there exists a randomized operation + such that Enc(pk, x) +
1In the simplest scenario, we have to restrict to non-privacy-conscious users. But it would also be possible
to compute item profiles using privacy-preserving matrix factorization [15].
2Notice in particular that, in the privacy-preserving matrix factorization protocol in [15], in case of collusion
between the CSP (Crypto Service Provider) and the analyst, it is possible to recover all data sent by the user.
This means that governmental agencies may force the recommendation systems to disclose these private user
attributes.
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Enc(pk, y) is distributed identically to a fresh ciphertext of x + y. This operation can be extended
to a scalar multiplication by an integer k: k  Enc(pk, x) is a fresh ciphertext of k · x; that is,
x+ x+ · · ·+ x (k times).
To simplify the notation, we will sometimes use JxKpk for Enc(pk, x) and omit pk when clear from
the context. We so have Jx+ yK = JxK + JyK and Jk · xK = k  JxK.
Example 1 (Paillier encryption scheme). We recall the Paillier encryption scheme [17], which is
an homomorphic encryption scheme that is semantically secure under the Decisional Composite
Residuosity (DCR) assumption. (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1κ) generates two large equal-length primes p
and q, computes n = pq, and sets λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) and µ = λ−1 mod n. The public key is
pk = n while the secret key is sk = (n, λ, µ). c ← Enc(pk, x) picks a uniformly random integer
ρ ← [1, n) and returns c = (1 + xn)ρn mod n2. x ← Dec(sk, c) returns x = L(cλ mod n) ·
µ mod n where L(a) = (a−1)/n. The scheme is additively homomorphic: given cx ← Enc(pk, x)
and cy ← Enc(pk, y), cx + cy = cx · cy · θn mod n2 with θ ← [1, n).
Oblivious transfer. A 1-out-of-M oblivious transfer (OT) protocol is a cryptographic protocol
between two parties: a sender and a receiver. The receiver has an index j∗ ∈ {1, . . . ,M} as input.
The sender knows a database {xj}j=1,...,M . At the end of the protocol, the receiver learns xj∗ , while
the sender learns nothing.
As in our protocolM is the number of items in the database, we need to use practical OT protocols
with communication complexity sublinear inM . We propose to use as 1-out-of-M OT the basic PIR
(Private Information Retrieval) protocol in [16, Sect. 2.2] using the Paillier homomorphic encryption
scheme, together with a classical 1-out-of-
√
M OT [12] which is used to mask the PIR database. The
resulting OT has two rounds (one message from the receiver to the sender followed by one message
from the sender to the receiver) and its communication complexity is proportional to
√
M .
2.2 Matrix factorization
The goal of matrix factorization is to predict unobserved ratings ri,j for some user i and some item j,
given access to a setD of user/item pairs (i, j) for which a rating ri,j ∈ R has been generated. Matrix
factorization provides d-dimensional vectors ui,vj ∈ Rd such that
ri,j ≈ rˆi,j := 〈ui,vj〉 =
d∑
k=1
ui,k vj,k for (i, j) ∈ D . (1)
This allows the analyst to predict missing ratings (i.e., those with (i, j) /∈ D). Vector ui is referred
to as the profile of user i while vector vj as the profile of item j.
2.3 Learning the profile of a user
Specifically, when a new user wishes to use the service, she submits a batch of s ratings {rj}j∈S
for a subset S of s ≥ d items. Upon receiving these ratings, the analyst can estimate her profile u
through the following least-squares estimation,3
argmin
u∈Rd
∑
j∈S
(
rj − 〈u,vj〉
)2
, (2)
and subsequently predict ratings for items j /∈ S, using Eq. (1).
Defining matrix VS = ( vj1 . . . vjs ) ∈ Rd×s and column vector r = (rj1 , . . . , rjs)⊺ ∈ Rs,
the profile u of a user can be computed as follows:
u = (VS · V ⊺S )−1 · VS · r =
(
s∑
k=1
vjk · v⊺jk
)−1
·
(
s∑
k=1
rjk · vjk
)
. (3)
3To ease the presentation, linear regression is considered but the proposed techniques readily apply to the
more general setting of ridge regression.
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3 Our learning protocol
We design a two-round learning protocol between a privacy-conscious user i and an analyst, allowing
the user to learn her profile u from her (private) ratings {rj}j∈S, where S = {j1, . . . , js}. At the
end of the protocol, the analyst will learn nothing (except the size s of S), while the user will only
learn her profile u and nothing else about the analyst database (except the dimension d, the database
of items and its size M , and bounds Br and Bv on entries of ratings rj and of profiles of items vj ,
respectively).
We insist that our protocol hides the set of actual items S that the user is rating as they might already
leak significant information about her. If an upper bound S on |S| is known, the exact size s of S
can trivially be masked by adding fake items (with profile 0 and fake rating 0) so that the protocol
always uses a set S of size S.
3.1 Protocol
Consider the ring Zn. We assume that n is either a prime or is hard to factor, so that for all intents
and purposes Zn behaves as a field (since a non-zero non-invertible element of Zn would yield a
factor of n). Up to using fixed point arithmetic (e.g., by multiplying values by some integer 2ℓ), we
suppose that the entries of VS and r are integers, and so can be considered as elements of Zn.
Round 1. The user generates a key pair (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1κ) for the homomorphic encryption
scheme and encrypts her ratings rjk : ck ← JrjkK for 1 ≤ k ≤ s. She also initiates s independent
OT protocols as a receiver with respective selection indexes j1, . . . , js.
Round 2. The analyst generates and computes the following matrices (over Zn and over the ci-
phertext space respectively):4
Ak,j = R0 · vj · v⊺j +Rk , Jαk,jK = (R0 · vj) ck + JρkK ,
where {Rk}1≤k≤s and {ρk}1≤k≤s are uniformly random matrices and vectors summing up to zero
in Zd×dn and Z
d
n respectively, and R0 is a uniform matrix in GL(d,Zn) (the group of invertible
matrices in Zd×dn ).
The analyst then answers the k-th OT message from the user, as an OT sender with database
{
xk,j =
(Ak,j , Jαk,jK)
}
1≤j≤M
.
Final step. The user receives xk,jk = (Ak,jk , Jαk,jkK) through the OT protocols. We write Ak =
Ak,jk and αk = Dec(sk, Jαk,jkK). We then remark that, in Zn:
(VS · V ⊺S )−1 · VS · r =
(
s∑
k=1
Ak
)−1
·
(
s∑
k=1
αk
)
.
So if n is large enough, the user can compute back u using rational reconstruction [21, 5] (we recall
that u satisfies Eq. (3) over the rationals, and that u is not necessarily an integer).
Bounds for correctness. The scheme is correct when the above rational reconstruction suc-
ceeds. From [21, 5] and Hadamard’s inequality, we can show correctness when n >
2dd+1/2s2d+1B4d+1V Br, where BV and Br are upper bounds on the absolute values of the coeffi-
cients of the item profiles vj and of the ratings rj , respectively. For example, if BV = 2
20, Br = 4,
d = 8, s = 10, this is already satisfied for an integer n of 806 bits.
Security. Security against semi-honest adversaries follows from the security of the OT protocol,
the IND-CPA property of the homomorphic encryption scheme, and from the following fact: since
VS · V ⊺S is invertible and GL(d,Zn) is a group, {Ak}k and {αk}k only reveal u.
4We slightly abuse notation here. For vectors, the bracket notation and + and  operators are applied
component-wise.
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3.2 Instantiation using Paillier homomorphic encryption scheme
The scheme can be instantiated using the Paillier encryption scheme and the OT described in Sec-
tion 2. We can use the internal construction of the OT, to avoid sending ciphertexts of rjk . Con-
cretely, in the OT construction, the user encrypts a vector (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0) used to “select” the
correct value to be received. If we use two OT protocols for each k, one for Ak and one for αk
(instead of a single one for the pair (Ak,αk)), then for the second OT, the user just encrypts rjk
instead of 1, she will receive rjk times the value to be received.
The resulting protocol for M = 100 items, dimension d = 8, and s = 10 ratings from the user
(modulus n of size 1024 bits for Paillier encryption scheme and an elliptic curve over a 256-bit
prime field for the base OT [12]), has the following performance on a non-optimized single-thread
implementation (on a laptop, CPU Intel® i7-7567U, 3.5GHz, turbo 4GHz): less than 0.4s to gener-
ate the first round by the user, less than 150s to generate the second round by the analyst, less than
1.4s to finalize the protocol by the user. The user requires less than 2s of computation (excluding
communication). The analyst time is mostly spent in the exponentiations required in the OT protocol
(modulo n2): there areM · (d2 + d) · s of them. These exponentiations can be trivially parallelized.
The communication complexity is less than 2MB and essentially grows linearly with
√
M .
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